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I. INTKCOUCTION
The oil crisis has largely dominated the political scene in
Iran diiring 1950 and up to the present time. The eyes of the trtiole world
are on Iran, and the possibility that most or all of the oil production
there might be temporarily lost to the free world has created considerable
anxiety in many of the world's capitals.
Both upper and lower chambers of the Iranian Parliament have
voted for nationalization of oil. The British do not deny the right of
Iran to nationalize, but do object strenuously to the fona of expropria-
tion.
The scope and purpose of this paper is to summarize the develop-
ment of the present situation, to estimate the probable effect of the loss
of Iranian oil, and to suggest certain actions which might lessen the effect
of such loss on the world oil situation.

II. HISTQta OF OIL DEVELOPMENTS
A. General Simmary
Until recently there were only two oil companies in Iran, the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Limited, and the Iran Oil Company.* The latter
was a Government company formed in 19h9 to exploit Iran's oil resoiirces in
the area not under concession. The Iran Oil Company has been making swr-
veys and plans to drill test wells, but has not yet produced oil.-^
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company stems from the D'Arcy Concession,
obtained from the Iranian Government in 1901. Oil was struck in 1908 and
the folloYong year a compare, now known as the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,
was formed to take over the D'Arcy Concession. In 19lii the British Admiralty
placed a long-term contract with the company for fuel oil at reduced prices.
At the same time the British Parliament authorized the British Government to
invest two million pounds sterling in the company, thus acquiring a majority
interest which it still retains.
The D'Arcy Concession was cancelled by the Iranian Government in
November 1932, and after a series of negotiations a new concession agree-
ment was concluded on April 29, 1933> valid for sixty years, Tv/o important
provisions of the agreement limited the area of the new concession to 100,000
square miles and changed the basis of royalty payments from the previous l6
per cent of net profits to a tonnage basis. The operations of the company
* Other concessions have been granted in the past, all but one of which, the
Kavir Khurian concession, have definitely expired or have been cancelled
1 References at end of paper
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continued to expanc: \intii the outbreak or 'rtorid War li, which brought lirst
a decline ajid later an increase in the activities oi the company.
In October 19kli the Majlis passed a law forbidding the granting
of further concessions to foreigners and directing the Government to complete
surveys of the oil-bearing areas of the country within five years with a
view to exploitation through enactment of appropriate legisJ.ation. Keceiving
impetus from this law, the Government negotiated vjlth Anglo-Iranian in IS'iiB
and iyii9 with a view to revision of the ly33 Concession. The Supplemental
Agreement, signed in July lyliy, provided for substantially increased royalty
and tax revenues, annual payment of Iran's share in the company's general
reserve, a lixed minimum yearly dividend participation and general reserves
payment, and a lump sum for accrued reserves and retroactive payments. The
proposed agreement vras submitted to the Majlis for ratification, but that
body failed to act before it adjourned at the end of the month.
In June 1950, the Majlis appointed a Commission of eighteen deputies
to make a study and submit a report, shortly thereafter the Mansur Government
was succeeded by the Razmara Government, The Majlis recessed from August 7
to September 3 and v/hen it reconvened, its Oil Commission began the active
study of the proposed agreement.
In late November the Commission, by unanimous vote, reported to the
Majlis its recommendations that the agreement be rejected as failing to safe-
guard the rights of Iran, and that the Government be instructed to reopen
negotiations with a view to obtaining better terms. A movement to nationalize
the Anglo-Iranian concession had gained momentimi in tne previous months, and
debate in the Majlis became more heated. The Government considered it expe-
dient to withdraw the Oil Bill and this was done by the Minister of Finance in
late JJecember. The Majlis then passed a Single Article Law early in January,

195lj rejecting the stand taken by the Minister of Finance, vrtio subsequently
resigned under pressure. A few days later, the Majlis approved its Oil
Commission's recommendations in principle and instructed it, not the Govern-
ment, to consider proposals for the solution of the country's oil problems
and to formulate, within two months, the nation's oil policy for consider-
ation by the Majlis. Razmara's request that the Majlis and Senate designate
representatives for the purpose of consultation with the Goverament was re-
jected. This action was approved by the Senate.
On March '(, 195l> Premier Ali Razmara was assassinated by a fan-
atical mraaber of a brotherhood KnoTiin as "li'edayan Islam". On March 20,
Dr. Mohammed Mossadeq succeeded in having his unconditional oil nationaliza-
tion program passed by the Parliament by unanimous vote. This was follovred
"by the designation of Mossadeq as Premier. Prior to Razmara's assassination,
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in an attempt to forestall nationalization,
proposed a transfer of the company's physical operations in Iran to a new
British company, in which Iran would be represented, and profits equally
shared. This offer was rejected. At the end of April, spokesmen for the
British Government expressed a willingness to recognize nationalization, but
continued to maintain that expropriation was illegal. On May 8, the Anglo-
Iranian informed Dr. Mossadeq and the Minister of Finance that the Company
desired arbitration under the terms of the 1933 Agreement. This request was
also refused by the Iranian Government.
3
One requirement of the new nationalization law stipulated that a
"Mixed Board" take over the control oi the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in Iran,
and among other things check the books of the Company. One of the first
demands placed before the company's representatives was that they hand over
at once the books of the company and 75 per cent of its net proceeds since
Mardi, 19^1. This was refused by the company. The company threatened to

close down the industry by removing the British technicians, and the British
Government sent a cruiser into the Persian Gulf to protect British lives
and assist in the evacuation of the technicians, should this course of action
become necessary. In the meantime the oil production has continued to decline
andy as of the end of June, ly5l» the harbor of Abadan remained cluttered with
empty tankers whose captains refused to sign a receipt for oil to the new-
National Oil Gon^jany.

B. Provisions of the Present Oil Nationalization LafA
The present law provides as follows;
1, For the purpose of regulating the execution of the Law of
March 20, iy5l, which nationalizes the oil industry throughout the country,
a Mixed Board shall be formed. This Board shall consist of five members of
the Senate and five Deputies of the Majlis to be elected by each of these
two Houses, the Minister of Finance or his deputy, and one other person to
be elected by the Government,
2, Under the supervision of the Mixed Board, the Government is
charged to remove forthwith the former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company from con-
trol of the oil industry of the country. Should the Company make its claim
for compensation an excuse to forestall prompt delivery, the Government may
deposit up to 25 per cent of the current incOTie, less cost of production, in
the Bank Melli or in any bank acceptable to both parties to secure the claim.
3, Under the supervision of the Mixed Board, the Government is
charged to investigate the lawful and rightful claims of the Government as
well as those of the Company, to report its views thereon to the two Houses
of Parliament and upon approval to give effect thereto,
U« From March 20, 195l> ^en the Bill for the nationalization of
the oil industry received the ratification of the Senate, the Iranian nation
being lawfully entitled to the entire earnings derived from oil and oil pro-
ducts, the Government under the supervision of the Mixed Board, is charged to
investigate and check the accounts of the Companyj similarly, the Mixed Board
must meticulously supervise the exploitation of the oil resources from the
date this Law went into effect until the appointment of a Board of Management,
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5. As soon as possible, the Mixed Board shall prepare the Charter
of the National Oil Company including therein provision for the appointment
of a Board of Management and a Board of Technical £i3q)erts; such Charter shall
be sutanitted to the two Houses for their approval.
6. For the purpose of gradually replacing foreign technicians by
Iranian technicians, the Ifijced Board is charged to draw up regulations for
the annual selection, through competitive examinations, of students to be sent
abroad for education, training and experience in the various branches of the
oil industry; these regulations after being approved by the two Houses shall
be put into effect by the Ministry of Education. The cost of training these
students shall be paid out of the oil earnings.
7. Purchasers of the products of the oil fields from which the
former Anglo-Iranian Oil Company has been removed can hereafter purchase annu-
ally at current world market prices the same quantities purchased by them
annually during the period coaaaencing from the beginning of lyiiS up to March
20, 1951. For additional qiiantities they shall enjoy priority, other condi-
tions being equal.
8. All proposals of the Mixed Board shall be delivered to the Majlis,
and if approved by its oil commission the latter shall submit a report thereon
to the Majlis for ratification.
9* The Mixed Board must complete its work within three months of
the approval of this Law, and submit a report of its actions to the Majlis in
accordance with Article 8. Should the Board need a longer period of time it
may ask for an extension giving adequate reasons therefor.

III. IRANIAN PUBLIC REVENUE DERIVED FHCM THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY
A. From 1933 to 1950
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company having been the only producing petro-
leum company in Iran, all of the Iranian Government's revenues from petroleum
operations came from this ccanpany.
Direct payments to Iran since 1933 are shown in the following
table:.5














1950 (estijnated) 15,951^,000 (b)
(a) Includes royalty, taxation, gold premium and 20 per cent
dividend participation.
(b) Computation based on estimated royalty tonnage for 1950 of
30 million metric tons (approximately 227 million U.S. barrels)




B. Kevenue Provisions of ly33 Agreement
The 1933 Agreement provided for the following annual payments:
1. Four shillings on each metric ton of the royalty tonnage, which
is defined as petroleum sold for constmiption in Iran or exported from Iran,
2. A payment in lieu of taxation consisting of one shilling per
ton on the first 6 million tons of the royalty tonnage and nine pence for each
ton in excess of 6 million tons,
3» A gold premium payment to compensate for changes in the value
of English currency, conqputed by multiplying both the royalty payment and the
payment in lieu of taxes (as computed in 1» and 2. above) by a fraction, the
numerator of which is the difference between the London price of an ounce of
gold, at the time of the particular payment, and the price of an ounce of
gold as specified in the agreement (120 shillings), and the denominator of
which is the price specified in the agreement,
li, A sum equal to 20 per cent of the distribution to ordinary
stockholders, in excess of 671,250 pounds sterling. This is usually referred
to as a participation in dividends, and the figure has remained constant the
past few years. Payment of the 20 per cent dividend participation is simul-
taneous with any distribution of dividends to the ordinary stockholders.
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C. Proposed Increased Payments Under Supplemental Agreement 19h9
Under the Supplemental Agreement of 19U9j payments would have been
Pounds Sterling
Total 19hQ, 19h9, 1950 payments under
Supplemental Agreement 67,966,UlO
Retroactive one-time payment as Iran's
20 per cent share of general reserve
accumulated to December 31, 1950 5, 090 > 909
Total payments under Supplemental Agree-
ment through 1950 73,059,319
Total payments under 1933 Concession
through 1950 38,615,516
Excess of payments under Supplemental





1. Although exact figures are not generally available on revenues
from internal taxes and duties on petroleum products, it has been eatimated
that such revenue in 1^50 amounted to 6o6 million rials, or approximately
19 million dollars,
2. in addition to making direct payments, the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company converted large sums of pounds sterling into rials eacii year to de-
fray locai e:q>enditures, at the official rate of exchange as required by the
Iranian Government. In 19^0 this amounted to 2l,k57flOk pounds sterling
(1,918,265,098 rials, at the official exchange rate of 89.1; rials to the
pound).
The sale by Anglo-Iranian of pounds sterling for rials was, on the
surface, merely an exchange transaction representing no income for the Iranian
Government. In reality, the Iranian Government was able to and did sell this
exchange to importers at a rate in excess of the official rate. A conserva-
tive rate of exchange to employ in calculating the gain to the Iranian Govern-
ment is perhaps 112 rials to the pound sterling. On this basis the gain can
be estimated at a minimum of k^S million rials, or approximately 13 million
dollars at the official rate of exchange of 32 rials equals one dollar.
3. Other sources of income to Iran were derived from Anglo-iranian
shares owned by the Iranian Government, from personal income taxes levied on
Anglo-Iranian personnel, and import duties on Anglo-Iranian imports not con-
sidered necessary for operations and therefore subject to duties. It has been
estimated that in 1950 these revenues would total 200 million rials, or approx-
imately 6 l/k million dollars.
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The approximate total income to Iran from petroleum in iySO may
be estimated at 2,232,000,000 rials, or approximately 70 million dollars.
This does not include gains from the sale by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company of
pounds sterling for rial expenditures at the official rate.
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IV. COwSBQUENCES OF NATIONALIZATION
A. Iran
The lightheartedness with which nationalization has thus far been
acclaimed in Teheran, as an alternative to rauch higher annual money payments
by Anglo-Iranian, is evidence that the implications of a step that threatens
to sever Iranian oil fields and the Abadan refinery from the company* s world-
wide transportation and marketing organization have not been seriously studied
by the proponents of such action. Iran would herself be the immediate and
the main sufferer from such an extreme course. The loss of crude oil produc-
tion can possibly be made up by Anglo-Iranian and other producers from other
sources within a short time, but the loss of the esqjortation of refined pro-
ducts from the Abadan refinery would be a serious blow to Iran, Great Britain,
and other Eastern Hemisphere countries. Abadan is the largest refinery in
the world, with a daily throughput of approximately 5^0^000 barrels, and em^-
ploying about 35>000 Iranians in an area where there is no other industry and
no agriculture.
Political and economic chaos would follow any attempt by Iran, as
presently expressed by Premier Mossadeq, to run the oil industry itself,
Iran lacks both the technical personnel and the necessary shipping, and it is
doubtful whether they could procure either anywhere in the world. The loss
of income would probably plunge Iran into bankruptcy and civil strife. Iran




Britain gets b7 far the largest share of her domestic oil directly
from Iran, as well as fuel for her navy and merchant marine. "While a switch
to other soiirces could eventually be made, any prolonged break in the flow
would cause serious trouble.
Another aspect of the problem is that Anglo-Iranian represents one
of her largest single overseas revenue-producing investments. The British
Government ovms 52.^ per cent of the stock of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The
physical assets of Anglo-Iranian, today, represent an investment of close to
one billion dollars.
''
The amount of tax charged the company by the British Government is
supposedly greater than the total amount paid by the company into the Iranian
Treasury.
Not the least disturbing aspect of the developments in Iran is that
"nationalization" carries -with it a unilateral breach of the agreement made
in 1933> for a period of 60 years, between the Iranian Government and the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Gompai^, an agreement which resulted from the British
Government taking the case to the Council of the League of Nations under Art-
icle XV of the Covenant of that body. There can be no doubt but that the
agreement was entered into freely by the Government of Iran.
Article 21 of the 1933 Agreement provided:
"This concession shall not be annulled by the Government
and the terms therein contained shall not be altered
either by general or special legislation in the future,
or by administrative measures or sny other acts whatever




The issue is not one of nationalization, since Iran has always
owned the oil reserves, but it is one of abrogation of contract. It must be
agreed that if sovereign, governments are to abrogate contracts unilaterally
whenever it suits their purpose, there will be no basis for international
coaanercial relationships. If we are to have a v/orld governed by law rather
than by force, it becomes necessary to regard it as no more a limitation on
a nation's sovereignty to be required to respect the contracts it has freely
made, than to regard it as a limitation on an individual's freedom that he
do likewise.
If expropriation is carried out, the Iranian Government is quite
imable to pay compensation which, under international law, must be adequate,
prompt, and effectively made in acceptable currency.
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C. North Atlantic Treaty Countries
Since it is estimated that 2$ per cent or more of iiurope's petro-
leijm comes from the Iranian fields, the shutting off of this supply would
have a crippling effect both on the economy and the rearming efforts of the
Atlantic Pact countries.^ Not only would fuel supplies for planes, tanks,
ships, and military and commercial vehicles be cut, but so would the stock-
piling of these fuels for a possible -war emergency.
Oil consumption and supply of the Atlantic Pov/ers and o f their
likely enemies provide many marked contrasts affecting their respective
military balance sheets. For both sides oil is one of the key commodities.
In any armed conflict with the Soviet Union, the relative position of each
side in regard to oil supplies remains of crucial significance.
The broad outline of the present oil picture is fairly well known.
On the one side is the United States producing within its own frontiers over
6 million barrels per day^^ (see Table 1, Appendix), importing a further
900,000 barrels a day^-^ (see Table 2, Appendix), exporting a relatively small
quantity. Canada and "Western htirope with rising consumption no7f need nearly
725,000,000 barrels a year. In the case of iiJurope all but approximately five
per cent must be imported. Over 90 per cent of the oil produced outside the
United States, the Soviet Union, and Eastern Europe is in the hands of Ameri-
can or Western European oil companies."
On the other side of the picture is the Soviet Union with a popula-
tion half as large again as the United States using only about an eighth the
volume of oil, nearly all of v/hich is produced within its frontiers, with
supplementary supplies obtained from itumania. China with its Ii50 million
people is virtually without oil.

For both sides, availability of oil in v^ar, like that of other
essentials, is governed by transport, manul'acturing facilities, steel sup-
plies, and a number of other inter-related matters, while the adequacy
of supplies is determined to a large extent by irreducible civilian needs,
A factor which must not be overlooked is that under the Marshall
Plan, practically all of the Atlantic Pact countries have converted many of
their industrial plants from coal to oil.
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D. Russia and the Communist Bloc
For years, the Soviets appear to have been striving to soften Iran
by continuous propaganda, largely through the small but active underground
Iranian Corannmist Tudeh Party, as v/ell as by unjust accusations against the
Iranian Government.
It is not believed that Russia would gain very much oil from the
Iranian nationalization. The Russians do not have technicians to spare to
operate the Iranian fields and the Abadan refinery if the British are expelled.
There is only a single-line railway, with few tank cars, spanning the 800
miles of rugged terrain between Abadan and the nearest port on the Caspian
Sea. But the denial of this important source of supply to the West would be
an important strategic and psychological victory for the Communists.
If Britain tries to use force in retaining control of the Anglo-
Iranian Concession the Soviet Union could, under the treaty of 1921, march
her armies into Iran, supposedly to prevent a third power using Iran to
re-establish the Czarist regime. Such an action would be difficult to stop
and in a comparatively short time Russia would control Iran, and probably
Iraq. In any case it would be the first step towards the start of World War
III.
The Soviets presumably must be aware that such a military gain
wo\ild only be of temporary advantage, for they would be unable to hold the
oil installations long enough to produce and make use of any worthwhile
quantity of oil from the existing Iranian fields. This suggests that the
political and infiltration methods of the Russians will probably be continued,
and perhaps intensified in Iran, in order to make it increasingly difficult
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for the British to operate their concessions and ea^Dort oil and at the same
time maintain friendly relations "wiiti the Government, imless the Soviets feel
that the loss of oil to the British is worth risking an all-out -war.
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V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS n'Od THE IriAlM'IAW OIL GHISIS
A. Canrproiaise
Some form of compromise •which would allow the Iranian Government
to extricate itself from a very ticklish position because of national pride
and permit the Anglo-Iranian or a new company to operate the oil industry
and thus make adequate compensation for financial loss is the most hoped for
solution, in the free world, to the Iranian crisis.
Bringing any oil negotiations to a point of mutual acceptance is
going to be very difficult, because Premier Mossadeq is, and has been fer-
vently nationalistic for some time. He was the instigator of the present
nationalization law. With the agitation for nationalization being maintained
at white heat by the underground communist party, it will take a great deal
of clear thinking and level-headedness on both sides to come to an aniicable
solution.
It is generally admitted that if Anglo-Iranian had taken heed of
the rising feeling of nationalizm in Iran and had taken some positive steps
to meet the justifiable demands of Iran, the present crisis might never have
come about. It should have been obvious that when the United States oil con-
cessionaires (ARAMGO) worked out a new agreement with Saudi Arabia, for a
50 per cent of net operating profits, that Iran, as an even bigger producer,
would demand at least as favorable a percentage. Aramco's latest revision,
signed December 30, 1950, follows much the same pattern as that in effect
for several years in Venezuela, where the Government adjusts its income tax
to obtain a total income from petroleum developments, including royalty, that
is equal to company profits.
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In the case of Aramco, iinder the terms of the agreement the ccm-
12pany's gross income will be subject to four classes of deductions:
!• Operating e^qienses
2. Exploration and developnent expenses
3. Depreciation
ii. Foreign government taxes, including United States inccme
taxes actually paid or payable
Half the remaining net operating revenue becomes the maximum limit
of payments of all kinds to the Saudi Arabian Government, including royalty,
and the various miscellaneous levies now collected such as import duties,
visa fees, and port charges.
An arrangement similar to the foregoing would appear to be an
equitable agreem^t and should be offered by Anglo-Iranian. The Iranian
Government must realize that they are unable to obtain technicians to oper-
ate the oil industry since the State Department has assured the British
Government that no American company will take over operations in Iran. How-
ever, as a possible solution, both Iran and Anglo-Iranian might well consider
the possibility of having an American concern act as impartial observer to
assure that any newly-formed combined company is operating for the best
interests of both parties and the oil industry as a whole,
Althoxigh the United States does not obtain oil from Iran directly,
the loss of that oil to the British and "S?estem Europe would cause a con-
siderable strain on our resources, therefore, it is essential that every
effort, both diplomatically and through the oil industry, be made to effect




Rationing of petroleum places a strain on the relationship existing
between the industry, public, and government. The government does not like
to have rationing and would prefer the companies to make up their own system
if it is required. The public has never been happy about rationing. In the
United States d\iring World War II, rationing was never popular and brought
forth storms of protests. As a result, the rationing program was a makeshift
one which changed with each new emergency. In England and most other western
European countries rationing was a necessity and has continued in some form
or other since the end of World War II.
With the prospect of losing Iranian oil there will undoubtedly be
some form of rationing applied, both in Europe and the United States. The
Petroleum Administration for Defense has already discussed possible rationing
programs, but the industry would prefer to make up the Iranian loss by cooper-
ative action such as pooling overseas facilities, exchange of tankers, etc.
If the controversy between Iran and Anglo-Iranian continues to
drag on there will be a period of perhaps a year before the amount of Iranian
oil could be made up in increased production and refining capacity, so the




The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, in association vath other companies,
has resources in Iraq ana Kuwait, as well as in Iran. Through its prospect-
ing subsidiary, the D'Arcy Exploration Company, it is interested in oil-bear-
ing territories in many parts of the world, including Great Britain where it
has a small producing oil field at Eakring. -^
The Kuwait and Iraq production can be stepped up to produce probably
half of the Iranian production. In one year from April, 1950 to April, 195l>
the production from Kuwait alone was increased by 197*000 barrels. Additional
crude can be furnished from the United States and Western Hemisphere sources.
As indicated by Table 3, Appendix,^ the increase in refining capa-
city of Great Britain and other European countries could make up the difference
from loss of the Abadan refinery. The increase in crude oil distillation in
Great Britain alone totaling 3l;9>820 barrels per day; that of France is 223,
550 barrels per day; Italy and the Netherlands, each over 100,000 barrels
per day.
There must of necessity be some form of reshuffling of world oil
distribution to prevent uneconomical cross-hauling. This may be accomplished
by cutting off United States imports from the Middle East, which in April,
1951 J amounted to approximately 100,000 barrels per day. Such action would
require additional production from United States and Western hemisphere sources,
which can be accomplished.
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D. Alternative Sources of Petroletim
1. Liquified Petroleum Gas, (LFG)
Already, an appreciable fraction of American requirements for
petroleum proaucts is being met by the condensation of liquid hydrocarbons
from natural gas.
Since 19U0, the total demand for LPG has increased tenfold to an
annual total of over '}>,'} billion gallons in lySO.^^ Of this, nearly 65 per
cent went to aomestic consumers for space heating, cooKing, refrigeration,
water heating, and other household and farm purposes, a quantity equal to about
one-fifth of the United States consumption of domestic heating oils.
The scope for extending the use of LPG to new fields of application
is probably greatest in road transportation. This vast potential field is
still in the early stages of commercial exploitation, altnough LPG is already
used in heavy roaa vehicles, buses and taxis. The fuel is ideal for internal
combustion engines. With an octane rating of 100 and above, it can be used
in high compression engines. It bums more cleanly than gasoline, reduces
the risk of crankcase oil dilution, and results in lower maintenance costs
and longer periods between overhauls. A recent order by the Chicago Transit
Authority for 500 new propane-fueled buses is significant evidence of the
attractions LPG propulsion offers under certain circumstances, where large
fleets of vehicles work within a small raoius and no vri.aespread supply system
is called for.
Another highly desirable field is that of agriculture, which
v/ould have the aaded aavantage of diminishing the winter peak aeraand by con-
stant summer users. On an average a farm tractor consumes up to k5ou gal-
lons per year, about ten times the average consumption in a household, but
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so far only about 100,000 tractors, or about three per cent of the total of
3»5> million, are as yet equipped to use LPG,
LPG manufacturers in the United States seem to be well capable of
meeting demands by a greatly expanded market. Compared with a production of
LPG in 1950 from natural gasoline plants of over three billion gallons, and
from oil refineries of one billion gallons, speakers at a recent annual meet-
ing of the American Society of Automotive ]ingineers ventured to estimate an
annual production of LPG by I96O of no less than 2^ billion gallons. This
is well over one-third of the present annual consimiption of gasoline in the
United States.
2. Oil Shale
The oil shale reserves of the United States have been estimated
conservatively to be about itOO billion tons, which contain approximately 92
billion barrels of recoverable oil. In France, the bitiaminous shale indus-
try is over 100 years old. The richest deposits lie in central France, at
Autun, where the reserves are estimated at 70 million tons, and at St. Hilaire,
iihere they are estimated at some 30 million tons. At St. Hilaire about 1,000
tons are handled daily, by specially devised plants that extract nearly 100
per cent of the potential maximum. In Great Britain only the Scottish shale
fields have been ccanmercially exploited. The seams of rich oil content extend
over an area of some 75 square miles, and have been mined for production since
I85l. The reserves of Scottish oil shales are estimated at between iibO and
880 million tons.
Sweden has an estimated one billion tons of oil shales minable by
open pits, and a total reserve of some five billion tons in localities con-
veniently situated for rail or water transport. The Swedish scientists have
been responsible for great inventiveness in oil extraction, in particular,
the Ljunstrom method of electrically heating the shale underground by means
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of bore-holes a few feet apart. Three months are required to heat the shale
before vapor is produced; vaporization then proceeds for about two months,
3. Coal
Methods of synthesizing petroleum products from coal, developed by
German scientists before and during World War II, are being checked and im-
proved in the research laboratories and demonstration plants of governmental
bureaus and private corporations in the United States and Western Europe. If
known techniques of producing petroleum products frem coal by chemical syn-
thesis were applied to the coal reserve of Great Britain, ail British
requirements for such products could be met for at least several hundred years.
Such a program, however, will take several years and the expendi-
ture of a great deal of money and materials, before final realization. Never-
theless, it is a program which would eliminate a crisis similar to the one
now being encountered, and consequently, one which should be kept uppermost
for accomplishment as soon as practicable.
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E. Use of Heavy Fuels
The possibility of satisfactorily using the heaviest grades of
fuel is of considerable importance from the supply point of view. Greater
flexibility in demand affords greater latitude to the refiner, while the
shipping industry will greatly benefit from its ability to draw upon a wider
range of plentiful and cheaper fuels.
The demand for distillate fuels is rising rapidly, while the demand
for heavy fuel oils is flattening out in the face of the great development
of natural gas and in view of the restoration everyvfhere of ample coal supplies.
The successful use of heavy fuels in marine diesels and gas tiirbine
locomotives has proven beyond a doubt that this fuel can be used at consider-
able saving in the cost of operation.
Several years' experience with the "Auricula" and many other motor
ships have proved the substitution of heavy fuels for diesel oils a ccanplete
success. Fuels up to 3jOOO seconds viscosity have been burned without diffi-
culty, with adequate provision for fuel preheating and purification, and alter
slight modifications in engine adjustment. At the present price difference
between diesel and heavy fuel oil, the o utlay for extra equipment may be
17
recovered through less than one years' saving in fuel costs. '
Diesel power, v^hile today universally recognized as perhaps the
most efficient form of locomotive propulsion, may not necessarily prove to
be the last word in rail traction. More and more of the leading makers of
locomotive diesels in Europe, as well as in the United States, are now also
intensely interested and are studying the potentialities of gas turbine for
rail use. For two years, a i;,800 b.h.p. unit, developed jointly by the
General Electric Company and the American Locomotive Company, has been under
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trial on freight hauling duties over various routes, 6ince the suimner of
19li9, it has been solely in the service of the Union Pacific Railway Company,
who have just ordered ten more locomotives of the same type. The turbines
will run on hea-vy boiler oil of bunker "C" grade after starting. -^^
Later projects reveal a significant trend towards the development
of gas turbines for operation on pulverized coal. Investigations into this
field have been in progress for several years on both sides of the Atlantic,
particularly in Great Britain, where research is predominantly focused on
pulverized coal, on gas obtainable by the underground gasification of coal,
as irell as on peat, as potential sources of power for land gas turbine instal-




It may be seen from the foregoing, that the Iranian Government's
decision to nationalize the oil industry oi' Iran, which actually amounts to
expropriation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's facilities in Iran, has
created a world crisis which could possibly lead to World War III.
There is little expectation that Iran alone could operate the oil
industry efficiently enough to provide oil products for export, and the
availability of foreign technical personnel for such work is not too promis-
ing. It has been shown that the monetary loss to Iran if production is lost
or declines considerably would amount to about half of the government's
revenue. The unemployment figure in Iran would mount by tens of thousands
and result in widespread unrest and dissatisfaction, both of which are con-
ducive to the spread of communist ideology. If Iran persists in her decision
to try and operate the oil industry alone, economic chaos will result, and
probably the government will be overthrown by the communistic Tudeh Party,
The loss to Great Britain will be considerably more than the mone-
tary value in and the income derived from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The
most seriously affected by even a temporary shutdown of Iran's production would
be Great Britain, TrVestem Europe, North Africa and various Far Jiast countries.
These countries depend upon Iran for almost 500,000 barrels daily to fill
petroleum requirements.
Any curtailment of production of Iran's facilities, with a total
capacity for 5^^0,000 barrels daily, would result in near total loss of that
amount of petroleum products to world supply channels. This is not a consider-
able amount when compared to the total world consumption, but it is the major
source of supply to iiiuropean, Asian and African countries.

30.
The possibility of off-setting loss or sharp curtailment in the
flow of Iranian oil has been pointed out. The primary method and the one
which will help to retain peace in the world, is compromise. There must be
a meeting of the minds, whereby an agreement can be reached between Iran and
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company vdiich provides for continuation of operation
of the Iranian oil industry. Such a compromise would have to incorporate
acknowledgment of nationalization oi Iran's oil industry, and arrange for
satisfactory payment to Anglo-Iranian for the value of their investment in
Iran. With the nationals of both Iran and England already considerably
wrought up over the oil situation, it is going to take a wise, impartial
arbitrator, friendly to both states to solve the problem.
If compromise fails, there must be a period of adjustment during
which demand va.ll be curtailed until nevf and increased output can fill the
gap in world demand left by the loss or decline in production of Iran. The
immediate remedy must be temporary rationing. Since the United States has
spent billions of dollars to bring about economic and political stability in
the free world, it would appear necessary for the United States to do every-
thing in her power to assure the maintenance of this stability. It may be
concluded then, that any rationing will be applied in the United States,
where, if less than ten per cent of daily consumption is made available for
e:3q)ort, the loss of Iran's output would be eliminated.
Certain steps may be taken by the various companies involved through
the loss of their former Iranian source oi oil products. These involve pool-
ing of facilities, exchange of tankers, and the elimination of cross-hauls by
parmitting all available Middle East oil to be sent to Western European refin-
eries rather than importing it into the United States. More than once in the
past the oil industry nas had to adapt itself to rapidly changing conditions,





YTOKLD CKlIDIi, OIL PKODUGTION
Thousands of Barrels Daily
Country April, 19^1 March, 1951 April, 1950
Western Hemisphere
Argentina 70.0 70.2 66.7
Bolivia o.y 1.0 1.7
Brazil 2.0 2.0 0.9
Canada 80.5 79.5 66.8
Chile 1.7 1.7 1.8
Colombia 107.1 107.6 9l;.0
Cuba 0.3 0.3 0.3
Ecuador 7.3 7*3 7.1
Mexico 200.0 207.2 193.1
Peru ii2.5 1;2.5 39.7
Trinidad 56.5 56.i^ 56.1
Venezuela 1,669.1;, 1, 676.il, i,i;ia4
Total 2,258.2 2,25i;.l 1,9^9:^
Europe-Africa
France 5.0 5.0 1.5
Fr. Morocco 1.3 1*3 0.7
Germany 2ii.6 2l;.0 21.2
Italy 0.1 0.1 0.2
Netherlands ll;.3 15.3
1;3.6Egypt U2.ii liO.3
United Kingdom 0.9 0.9 1.2
Total 58.6 W9 S2.I
Middle East
Bahrien 29.9 30.0 30.0
Iran 565.3 700.1 685.1;
Iraq 172.9 169.8 122.2
Kuwait 502.8 375.U 305.5





Total 2,011.2; 1,961.1 1,639.8
Far East
Br. Borneo 105.0 105.0 80.8
Burma 2.0 2.0 0.5
China 2.2 2.2 1.5











£. Europe 931.1 931.1 Q^$.o
Total Foreign 5,568.3 5,512.2 1;,781;.6
United States 6,114;.0 6,052.1; l;,968.i;,





















BCPQttTS Am EXPOiTS OP THE FwITED STATES
Thousands of Barrels



































































REFINERY CONSTRUCTION AND EJCPM3I0N PROGRAMS
(Degree of increase in throughput resulting from modernization, addi-
tions, and new refineries under construction or projected, in barrels
per day of throughput)
Crude Oil Thermal or
Country- Distillation Catalytic Cracking





Chile 111, 000 —
Colombia 22,^00
Mexico 76,150 —

















Saudi Arabia 300,500 —
Turkey 23,000 —








United Kingdom 3iiy.820 71,000





1. Annnal Report of Petroleimi Developments in Iran, 1250, American
Embassy, Teheran, no. 712, March 5, lySi.
2. Time, June ky iy5l.
3. The Oil Fornm , June, ly^l.
k» "Iranian Laws, Regulations^ and Official JMotices Relating to Oil
wationalization," DRM Ini'ormation Paper , no. 271, Department of
State, June ly, 19*^7
5. Murray, John, Iran Today, prepared for the Iranian Government,
October, 19$0.
6. Petroleum Press Service , vol. XVIlI, no. h, April, 195l«
7. Phillips, Cabell, "U. S. Plays Careful Role Seeking Iran Solution,"
New York Times, May 27, iy5l»
8. Harding, Charles L., "Current Middle ii;ast Oil Developments," talk
given before The Pennsylvania Grade Crude Oil Association, June Ik,
1951.
9. Petroleum Press Service , vol. XVIII, no, 1, January, 195l»
10. "World Crude Oil Production," Oil and Gas Journal
, June 21, 1951.
11. "Imports into Continental United States," Oil and Gas Journal,
June 21, 1951.
12. Th£ 2ii l2I^f March, 1951.
13. A Short History of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company , Anglo-Iranian
Oil Company, (I9li9).
111. Petroleum Press Service, vol, XVIlI, no. 3, March, 1951.
15. Fanning, Leonard IL., Our Oil Resources
16. Pratt, V/ailace E., ana Good, Dorothy, World Geography of Petroleum
,
(1950).




B. Related References not Cited
18. Piatt '
s
Oilgram, no. 12^, June 25, 1951.
19. "Stalemate in Iran," Oil and Gas Journal , June 28, 1951.
20. Report of Operations to the Saudi Arabian Government , The
Arabian-American Oil Company, (19^o7I
21. Summary of Middle East Oil Developments, The Arabian-American
Oil Company, (lyli^T^
22. Petroleum Press service , vol. XVI, no. 11, November, lyi+9.
23. wewsweek, i^^ay 26, 1951.
2U. The Lamp , Standard Oil Company, I\lew Jersey, June 1951*







7 2 9 7
2261Q
T^^^ suppi/^^'^^sis on
f"^ Possiblf f;^? ^^^"d,
'^« crisis "°^"*ions to
^^ 9S7 O'SPt^v




'^e probable effects of the
C.2 Iranian oil crisis on world
supply and demand, and possible
solutions to the crisis.

